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## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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SECRET-SENSITIVE

June 17, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Daily Report

Information

Wischnewski Comments on Meeting with Ghotbzadeh: During a meeting with Ambassador Stoessel on Saturday, SPD Deputy Chairman Wischnewski related details of a discussion that he and Willy Brandt held with Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh last Thursday in Oslo. Although little of real substance emerged from the meeting, Wischnewski said Ghotbzadeh claimed to have been working full time for the previous four to five weeks in one-on-one conversations to find a "peaceful and honorable" solution to the hostage crisis. He added that Ghotbzadeh characterized the Soviet threat to the region as far greater than any posed by the U.S. and had insisted that Afghanistan be made the Soviet Union's Vietnam. In regard to Iran's future in international politics, Ghotbzadeh felt Iran must avoid involvement with the superpowers and take its place among the nonaligned states.

(S)

In general, Wischnewski thought the session was a success. He said he was very impressed by Ghotbzadeh, who he found to be intelligent and clever, and in no way the victim of religious fanaticism. Wischnewski suggested that Spanish Socialist party leader Gonzales could prove to be a fruitful avenue of communication with Ghotbzadeh for the U.S. since the two had a relatively close relationship and since it was Gonzales in the first place who suggested to Ghotbzadeh that he visit Oslo. (S)

Helicopters for El Salvador: Ambassador White has seen sufficient signs of improvement in the human rights performance of the Salvadoran military to recommend that he be authorized to offer the loan of six helicopters. As part of his recommendation, White would like to offer out-of-country training of pilots, with delivery of the helicopters being accomplished only after the training and then only under the condition that the performance of the military continues to improve. He believes this offer would allow the U.S. to retain its influence with the military, who now feel the U.S. has abandoned them, as well as encourage them to improve their human rights performance.

ON-FILE NSC  
RELEASE

INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED SECONDARY REFERRAL  
TO DIADOS REVIEW  
COMPLETED

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REVIEW ON JUNE 16, 2010

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DIA review(s)  
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TNF: Most Allied representatives of the Special Consultative Group (SCG) remained firmly behind the current approach to TNF during yesterday's meeting. However, some members -- particularly the Scandinavians -- are increasingly restive about Soviet attempts to exploit the delay in SALT ratification as the reason for the lack of progress on TNF arms control and are more inclined than the rest to discuss the possibility of TNF discussions outside SALT. The German foreign office representative gave a tortuous explanation of Schmidt's proposal, which boiled down to the Chancellor's calling on the Soviets to halt deployment of the SS-20. He did not mention a halt only until 1983, which the Chancellor has proposed. In this connection, the Allies took special note of our presentation that the Soviets now have bases, either operational or under construction, to support 250 SS-20 launchers (750 warheads) -- approaching the originally projected level of 300 launchers. (S)

NSC ActivityNauru and the Asian Development Bank

The following facts relate to Nauru Ambassador T. W. Star's request during his recent credentials ceremony that you look into the reasons behind Nauru's rejection as a developing member of the ADB:

-- Nauru has a per capita income of \$6,000 due to mining of phosphates. The U.S. thus concurred in the ADB decision that Nauru not be granted developing member status.

-- Nauru's position is that once its phosphates are exhausted, in 15 years, it will become economically crippled.

-- Nauru wants to diversify its economy now through favorable development loans from the ADB. (U)

State arranged for Star to meet with appropriate officials from the Treasury Department. They suggested to the ambassador that Nauru might seek technical assistance on a reimbursable basis from the ADB in order to undertake an economic survey. This survey would lead to recommendations for Nauru over the long-term. (U)

State believes, and I concur, that this is the most productive course for Nauru to follow. (U)

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